When he died in summer 2000, Hafez al-Assad's arrangements for his succession were carefully planned. Once it was clear that his will would be respected, the power structure after his death was not in danger of disintegrating abruptly. But acceptance of Bashar al-Assad by the orphaned ruling elite implied guarantees to several parties: that the old guard would not be dismissed, and that the Assad family at large would have a say in decision-making.
After the death of Hafez's elder son and chosen successor Basil, there was no compelling reason why Bashar should rule as opposed to Hafez's other children Maher or Bushra, other than the fact that Maher is younger and Bushra a woman. Skills, or indeed the ambition to exercise power, were not a decisive factor. Bashar was faced with the choice of either relying on the old guard and becoming captive to it, or relying on his family circle and becoming hostage to it. He chose not to choose and ended up under dual control. Hafez's successor is not Bashar alone. It is the Assad extended family and an entourage of ambitious or greedy individuals.
Bashar has been running on the steam of his father's policies for five years without making any strategic choices of his own. Does he want to engage in economic reforms? After he called on senior Syrian experts from the World Bank and the diaspora to initiate the process, it soon became clear that no serious economic changes could be engaged without affecting the private interests of powerful individuals, and the process came to a halt. Did he envisage meaningful political reforms at any stage? On a dozen different occasions he ordered the release of political prisoners and allowed civil society groups to hold meetings in major Syrian cities. But he also ordered the closure of those same political forums and the arrest or re-arrest of hundreds of activists.
Bashar runs to Cairo or Riyadh to talk to Washington's closest allies every time he is concerned, but doesn't say he is choosing to be one of them. Does he want to build a strategic partnership with the EU? Negotiations were interrupted on the association agreement, which remains suspended. Does he want to see the Palestinian Hamas and Jihad movements succeed in thwarting an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement (if there is any chance for one)? Is he seeking to re-engage Syria in a bilateral peace process with Israel? What type of relations does Syria want with the US? Is Syria's support for the Iraqi resistance an ideological choice based on Baathist solidarity (since there is no Sunni connection to speculate on)? And did Syria think through the implications of meddling in the Iraqi situation and whether it could afford to defy the Bush administration on such a vital issue for the US as the pacification of Iraq? On all of these issues, we have seen a choice, then its reversal soon after.
Hafez al-Assad had carefully chosen the members of his inner circle and he trusted them to guarantee domestic stability. But strategic thinking about Syria's regional role, choice of allies, support for political and military factions, and relations with the US, Europe and Russia was a solitary exercise, and the men involved in foreign policy were mere implementers of his decisions. He left them some leeway in Lebanon, but all was done under close monitoring and constant fine-tuning by him personally. He managed to prevent unity of the Lebanese against Syria every time the risk emerged. He resorted to assassinations when he could not do otherwise, but manipulation and political tactics were the basis of his approach. From an Arab nationalist perspective, this policy was evil but smart. Bashar has maintained the evil methods but lacks the political skills of his father. The cynical equilibrium tactics of Hafez have turned into sheer inconsistency.
In the course of three years after his accession to power, Bashar succeeded in uniting the Lebanese against Syrian occupation. Now he is denouncing a united international front against his country. Following Detlev Mehlis' request to interrogate senior figures from the Syrian regime for their suspected involvement in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Bashar declared in a recent speech--the tone of which was a mix of provocation, paranoia and suicidal behavior--that Syria was offered the choice between "killing itself or being killed".
While it is true that the international consensus on the need to punish Syria if it is proven guilty is strong, there are important nuances between the approaches of the United States and Europe, particularly France, on the appropriate strategy. Paris is opposed to a strategy of isolation leading to a countdown for the overthrow of the Assad regime, whether by military means or slow suffocation through sanctions. The Syrian domestic situation is no less complex than the Iraqi one, no outside force has a recipe for successful regime change, and most importantly, there are opposition forces inside Syria who are able to make their voices heard.
The Syrian opposition is diverse and fragmented but has chosen a mature and cautious strategy. It engaged a large array of political forces in an inclusive coalition, including the Muslim Brothers, and produced a joint "Damascus Declaration" calling for dialogue with the government. While it is certainly emboldened by outside attacks on the regime, it explicitly rejects foreign support and presents itself as a patriotic force seeking peaceful change through a dialogue with the regime. It is nonetheless calling for reforms that imply transformation of the security-based regime into a political and civil state. Assuming that the present regime is reformable--an open question--it would take a particularly enlightened political leader at its head to carry out the process. It clearly does not have one at the moment.-

Bassma Kodmani is an associate professor at the College de France and director of the Arab Reform Initiative. Published 17/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org